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Naturalism and agnosticism (290,00 руб.)

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Первый авторWard James
ИздательствоBlack
Страниц230
ID88749
Ward, J. Naturalism and agnosticism : the Gifford lectures delivered before the University of Aberdeen in the years 1896-1898. Vol. 2 / by James Ward; J. Ward .— 3. ed. — : Black, 1906 .— 230 с. — Lang: eng .— URL: https://rucont.ru/efd/88749 (дата обращения: 11.11.2025)

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JAMES WARD NATURALISM AND AGNOSTICISM VOLUME II NATURALISM AND AGNOSTICISM THE GIFFORD LECTURES DELIVERED BEFORE THE UNIVERSITY OF ABERDEEN IN THE YEARS 1896–1898 BY JAMES WARD, Sc. <...> Third Edition November 1906 CONTENTS OF THE SECOND VOLUME PART III. <...> THEORY OF PSYCHOPHYSICAL PARALLELISM LECTURE XI VARIOUS FORMS OF THE THEORY These theories attempt to answer the question: How are psychical changes related to the physical changes in the organism? <...> They all start from the Cartesian doctrine of the essential disparateness and distinctness of Matter and Mind. <...> So far they have common thought on their side; hence it is advisable to enquire first whether they are tenable even on this dualistic assumption. .......................................... 16—19 What is meant by the physical series readily ascertained. <...> But the meaning of the psychical series not so clear. <...> It is not so much my consciousness as a unity for me as my consciousness as a series of events for the psychophysicist. <...> Ambiguities of the phrase "parallelism" in this connexion. ............. 19—23 (1) Clifford's exposition of Mind-stuff is only Matter-stuff over again. ..................................... 23—27 (2) The so-called Two Aspects theory assumes that two incompatible standpoints can be stereoscoped into one. ........................................ 27—30 3 Naturalism and Agnosticism Contents (3) The Conscious Automaton theory leaves the dualism untouched, and while asserting invariable concomitance tries to deny any causal connexion: the two series keep pace, but yet each "goes along by itself." On the psychical side, sensation, on the physical, life, are difficulties in the way of this theory. <...> Constant parallelism plus absolute separation is logically so unstable a position that this theory either lapses into some form of crude monism, or one series is in the end subordinate to the other. ..................................... 30—35 Among scientific men the primacy is usually given to the material side. <...> Be maintains that sensation is an effect of molecular change, but will not allow that molecular changes are ever the effect of volition. <...> It is maintained (1) that there can be no causal <...>
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Naturalism_and_agnosticism.pdf
JAMES WARD NATURALISM AND AGNOSTICISM VOLUME II
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NATURALISM AND AGNOSTICISM THE GIFFORD LECTURES DELIVERED BEFORE THE UNIVERSITY OF ABERDEEN IN THE YEARS 1896–1898 BY JAMES WARD, Sc. D. HON. LL.D. EDINBURGH; FELLOW OF THE BRITISH ACADEMY PROFESSOR OF MENTAL PHILOSOPHY AND LOGIC IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE THIRD EDITION VOLUME II "Wer die Gesetzmässigkeit der Natur für das verantwortlich macht, was wirklich geschieht, behauptet damit, dass sie Gedanken realisiere, und ist Teleolog ohne es zu wissen." — SIGWAKT. LONDON ADAM AND CHARLES BLACK 1906 All rights reserved
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First Edition (in two volumes) published June 1899 Second Edition August 1903. Third Edition November 1906
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CONTENTS OF THE SECOND VOLUME PART III. THEORY OF PSYCHOPHYSICAL PARALLELISM LECTURE XI VARIOUS FORMS OF THE THEORY These theories attempt to answer the question: How are psychical changes related to the physical changes in the organism? They all start from the Cartesian doctrine of the essential disparateness and distinctness of Matter and Mind. So far they have common thought on their side; hence it is advisable to enquire first whether they are tenable even on this dualistic assumption. ..........................................16—19 What is meant by the physical series readily ascertained. But the meaning of the psychical series not so clear. It is not so much my consciousness as a unity for me as my consciousness as a series of events for the psychophysicist. Ambiguities of the phrase "parallelism" in this connexion. .............19—23 (1) Clifford's exposition of Mind-stuff is only Matter-stuff over again. .....................................23—27 (2) The so-called Two Aspects theory assumes that two incompatible standpoints can be stereoscoped into one. ........................................27—30 3
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Naturalism and Agnosticism (3) The Conscious Automaton theory leaves the dualism untouched, and while asserting invariable concomitance tries to deny any causal connexion: the two series keep pace, but yet each "goes along by itself." On the psychical side, sensation, on the physical, life, are difficulties in the way of this theory. Bow they are got over. Constant parallelism plus absolute separation is logically so unstable a position that this theory either lapses into some form of crude monism, or one series is in the end subordinate to the other. .....................................30—35 Among scientific men the primacy is usually given to the material side. Huxley taken as a type. Be maintains that sensation is an effect of molecular change, but will not allow that molecular changes are ever the effect of volition. To justify this position volition has to be regarded as "feeling" or sensation simply. ...............................................................35—38 LECTURE XII THE CONSCIOUS AUTOMATON THEORY Doctrine of Conscious Automatism or Psychical Epiphenomenalism examined. It is maintained (1) that there can be no causal connexion between the psychical and the physical series, and yet (2) that the psychical is a 'collateral product' or epiphenomenon of the physical. The very statement is thus self-contradictory. ..................39—42 Mind thus becomes impotent to control matter. In accepting this position Naturalism is really at variance with itself. For (1) it elsewhere assumes that mind is an efficient factor in 4 Contents
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